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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

Case No.

930494-CA

vs.
Priority No.

2

DENNIS A. TEIPEL,
Defendant/Appellant.
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from judgment and conviction of burglary, a third
degree felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B
misdemeanor, in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, Judge,
presiding.

MANNY GARCIA (3799)
431 South 300 East, Suite 101
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 322-1616
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Telephone (801) 538-1022
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SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
After defendant was apprehended and arrested, an inventory of
the violated premises revealed many food items and other hardware
had been stolen, including cases of soft drinks and flashlights.
Defendant had none of the missing items, nor were they located.
Defendant testified he entered through the broken window to
conceal himself from public view and ingest cocaine. He no sooner
entered than the police arrived. He hid behind the office door and
was immediately arrested. No evidence was presented that defendant
had actually possessed or used cocaine.

All he had in his

possession was paraphernalia.
ARGUMENT
THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON A LESSER
INCLUDED OFFENSE.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Questions

of

law

are reviewed

for

correctness

with no

deference given to the trial court. Sanders v. Sharp 806 P.2d 198
(Utah 1991).
Defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser
included offense of Criminal Trespass, a class C misdemeanor. Utah
Code Ann., § 76-6-206, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
(1) For purposes of this section "enter" means intrusion
of the entire body.
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under
circumstances not amounting to burglary as defined in
1

Section 76-6-203, or 76-6-204:
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property
and:
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to
any person or damage to any property, including the use
of graffiti as defined in Subsection 78-11-20(2);
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other than
theft or a felony; or
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence
will cause fear for the safety of another; ...
(3) (a) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) is a class C
misdemeanor unless it was committed in a dwelling, in
which event it is a class B misdemeanor.
Trial counsel offered an instruction consistent with the above
cited provision (T.188) which the court refused (T.190).
In State v. Velarde 734 P.2d 440, 446 (Utah 1987), the Utah
Supreme Court reiterated the criteria necessary for the submission
of such an instruction.
This Court in State v. Baker 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983),
set forth the standards to be used to determine whether
a jury should be instructed on lesser included offenses.
If a defendant requests a lesser included offense
instruction, as was the case here, an evidence-based
standard controls. To determine whether an offense is
included in a charged offense, the trial court must first
decide whether the offense is established by proof of the
same or less than all the facts required to establish the
commission of the offense charged. If the same facts
tend to prove the elements of more than one statutory
offense and the evidence is ambiguous and susceptible to
alternative explanations, the trial court must give the
lesser included offense instruction if any one of the
alternative interpretations provides both a rational
basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the
offense charged and convicting him of the included
offense. Baker 671 at 158-60. See also State v. Oldroyd
685 P.2d 551, 553-54 (Utah 1989).
The State objected to the submission of the instruction,
reasoning that the trespass instruction could not apply as a matter
of law.

The prosecutor reasoned that because defendant had

admitted that he unlawfully entered the building for the purpose of
2

ingesting a controlled substance, defendant's acts would amount to
a felony, therefore the trespass instruction could not apply (T.
188-90).

The court agreed and denied the defendant's request for

the instruction.
There can be no question that according to the Baker criteria,
defendant was entitled to a lesser included instruction on an
evidence-based standard.
The elements of criminal trespass were shown by the same facts
needed to show burglary.

Unquestionably, defendant entered and

remained in the building illegally. The only question went to his
intent.
The evidence of intent was also ambiguous and susceptible to
alternative explanations. A jury could have rationally found that
defendant had merely committed a criminal trespass.
There was testimony that many items were missing from the
building, including flashlights, two dozen sandwiches and cases of
soft drinks.

(T. 133; 140; 142.)

There was no evidence that defendant had taken anything from
the building, nor any evidence that accomplices were involved.
Defendant's actions while inside, as witnessed by the police,
were consistent with his explanation that he was attempting to
conceal himself.

(T. 91(L.20-21); T. 159(L.25), 160(L.l-3).)

Given the opportunity, a reasonable jury could have found that
defendant committed criminal trespass since there was no evidence
of his intent to commit a theft, as charged in the greater offense
of burglary.

There was an alternative interpretation available to
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provide a rational basis for a verdict acquitting defendant of
burglary and convicting him of criminal trespass, based on the
explanation that he illegally entered the building intending to
conceal himself and inject drugs.

(T. 166(L.18-20); 172.)

The prosecutor's argument to preclude the instruction was
erroneous because there was no independent evidence that defendant
was intending to commit a felony.

There lacked a corpus delicti.

The only evidence relating to a felony came from defendant's
statement, not from independent evidence.
CORPUS DELICTI
"...we adhere to the doctrine that there must be
independent proof of the corpus delicti before the
confession can be received for the consideration of the
jury..."
State v. Johnson 83 P.2d 1010, 1014 (Utah
1938).
In State v. Hansen 857 P.2d 978, 980 (Ut. App. 1993) the court
revitalized the corpus delicti rule.
"A post-crime inculpatory statement is sufficient to
establish guilt of a defendant when there is clear and
convincing evidence independent of the confession that
the crime actually occurred." (Citing State v. Johnson
821 P.2d 1150, 1163 (Utah 1991).)
"An admission or a confession, without some independent
corroborative evidence of the corpus delicti, cannot
alone support a guilty verdict. To sustain a conviction,
the requirement of independent proof of the corpus
delicti requires only that the State present evidence
that the injury specified in the crime occurred, and that
such injury was caused by someone's criminal conduct.
State v. Knoefler, 563 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1977); see
also Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1162 n. 8. It is permissible
to use reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence
presented to establish the corpus delicti. See State v.
Cooley, 603 P.2d 800, 802 (Utah 1979)."
The State had no independent evidence that defendant had
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possessed or used cocaine. The only evidence of cocaine came from
defendant's post-crime statement.
The evidence showed defendant possessed an empty syringe and
a spoon.

(T. 115, 116.)

The prosecutor intimated there was "a

substance" on the spoon (T. 117), but presented no proof, and there
existed no independent evidence that it was indeed cocaine, save
for defendant saying so.
Therefore,

the

independent

evidence

did

not

show

that

defendant had entered either to commit a theft or a felony, merely
that he entered and remained while in possession of paraphernalia.
Possession

of

paraphernalia

is

a

misdemeanor.

Defendant's

statement cannot be used to fill in the void in the corpus delicti
of entering with the intent to possess or use cocaine.
The court erred in refusing to give the instruction.

It is

very likely the jury had conflict without the lesser option because
it was clear defendant had entered illegally.

They knew he had

done something wrong. With no evidence of theft, nor of any other
felony, the jury could have certainly convicted defendant of
criminal trespass if given the chance.
completely

They were unwilling to

forgive defendant's unlawful entry.

certainly guilty of something.

Defendant was

Without a choice, even though a

rational basis existed for a lesser included, the jury convicted
defendant of the greater offense.
MODIFICATION OF JUDGMENT/CONVICTION
The appellate court has general powers to modify criminal
judgments, and may, if requested by the defendant, enter a modified
5

judgment and conviction.

In State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209

(Utah 1993) the court stated:
"If.. .an appellate court on appeal.. .shall determine that
there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction
for the offense charged, but that there is sufficient
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense,
and the trier of fact necessarily found every fact
required for conviction of that included offense, the
verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or
revised and a judgment of conviction entered for the
included offense, without necessity of a new trial, if
such relief is sought by the defendant."
Defendant asks this court to review the evidence presented and
determine whether it presents a rational basis for a verdict
acquitting defendant of burglary and convicting him of criminal
trespass, and entering such judgment.
In determining

the existence of a rational

basis, the

reviewing court does not judge the credibility of the evidence, but
only decides "whether there is a sufficient quantum of evidence
presented to justify sending the question to the jury."

State v.

Baker. 671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah 1983). Further, the court must view
the evidence and the inference that can be drawn in the light most
favorable to the defense. State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 532 (Utah
1983).
Since the court erred in not instructing the jury on the
lesser

included

and

because

a

rational

basis

exists

for a

conviction on the lesser offense, defendant asks this court to
modify his conviction and enter a trespass conviction based on the
insufficiency of the evidence regarding defendant's intent to
commit a theft or other felony.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing defendant asks the court to reverse his
conviction for burglary and enter a judgment and conviction for the
lesser included offense of criminal trespass in violation of
Chapter 76-6-206 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended).

MANNY GARCIA^ v-=5*
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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